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Abstract 
Although business incentive programs of different forms have been the bulk of local 
economic development policies in many industrialized countries for more than the last three 
decades, evaluating their impact on employment or local economic growth outcomes remains 
a challenging task due to the persisting lack of randomized experiments and the presence of 
many confounding factors which affect firms and economic growth outcomes. Moreover, 
much of the recent advancements in the statistical program evaluation methodology 
applicable to non-experimental settings do not make any direct reference to the specificities 
posed by business incentive policies. This paper aims at offering some clear guidance on how 
to choose the appropriate focus of the evaluation, the policy relevant evaluation parameters 
and empirical impact identification strategies when applying statistical methods attempting to 
estimate how much of the different outcomes between treatment and control groups are 
attributable to the program/s being evaluated. Each methodological option discussed in the 
paper is linked to the different features of commonly implemented US and EU policies and to 
whether or not the analysis focuses on outcomes recorded at a firm-level or at the level of the 
geographic areas in which the assisted firms are located. 
 
 
JEL Classification: C40, C80, H81 
 
Keywords: Impact evaluation; Business Incentives Policies; Comparison-group designs, 
Identification strategies 
 
* The work that provides the basis for this paper was supported by funding under the PRIN-
2005 grant from MIUR (Italian “Ministry of Education, University and Research”). The 
author is solely responsible for the accuracy of the statements and interpretations contained in 
the paper. Such interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views of the Italian Ministry of 
Education, University and Research. The author thanks Robert Greenbaum for useful 
comments.  
 
** Corso Cavour 84, 15100 Alessandria, ITALY; daniele.bondonio@sp.unipmn.it  (e-mail) 
 
   2
 
1 Introduction 
Although business incentive programs of different forms have been the bulk of local 
economic development policies in many industrialized countries for more than the last three 
decades, evaluating their impact on employment or local economic growth outcomes remains 
a challenging task. Retrieving reliable program impact estimates can be more difficult for 
business incentives than for other public policies due to the persisting lack of randomized 
experiments, the presence of many confounding factors which affect firms and economic 
growth outcomes, and the often simultaneous presence of a significant number of many 
different competing programs in addition to the policy/ies being evaluated. 
  As also well argued in Bartik (2004), Bartik and Bingham (1997), statistical methods 
attempting to estimate how much of the different outcomes between treatment and control 
groups are attributable to the program/s are a crucial tool in evaluating business incentive 
policies in non-experimental settings. Sounds counterfactual statistical analyses on the 
proximate employment or local economic growth outcomes of the policies, moving away 
from the mere description of program activities, provide vital empirical evidence that are also 
a necessary base for possible subsequent survey and focus group analyses and/or regional 
econometric models aimed at estimating (when the importance of the program is appropriate) 
more distant fiscal and employment benefits in terms of long-run or province/regional/state- 
economy effects.  
  Unfortunately, most of the recently developed impact identification approaches 
developed by the statistical literature devoted to counterfactual comparison-group program 
evaluations [e.g.: propensity score matching with program heterogeneity and generalized 
propensity score for continuous treatment, Imbens (2000), Lechner (2001, 2002), Joffe and 
Rosembaum (1999), Lu et. Al. (2001), Hirano and Imbens (2004), and Imai and Van Dyk 
(2004); specification tests for non-experimental estimators based on partially fuzzy regression 
discontinuity designs, Battistin and Rettore (2008); conditional difference in difference with 
propensity score matching, Heckman, et. al.(1998); propensity score estimations as first stage 
processing for reducing model dependence in parametric estimators, Ho et. Al. (2007), 
estimations of the distribution of treatment effects, Abadie et. al (2002), Cheser (2003), 
Carneiro et. Al. (2003), Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005, 2006)] do not make any direct 
reference to the specific issues posed by business incentive policies. 
  This paper review and discusses such recent statistical developments aiming at 
offering some clear guidance on how to choose the appropriate focus of the evaluation, the   3
policy relevant evaluation parameters (average treatment effects versus distributions of the 
treatment effects) and the empirical impact identification methods for evaluating a variety of 
types of business incentive programs. Each methodological option discussed in the paper is 
linked to the different types of incentive policies commonly implemented in the US and EU 
countries and to whether or not the analysis focuses on outcomes recorded at a firm-level or at 
the level of the geographic areas in which the assisted firms are located. The paper extends 
and updates the work of Bartik (2004), Boarnet (2001), Bondonio (2000) and Bartik and 
Bigham (1997), which offered a first important contribution on statistical methods suited to 
evaluate local economic development and geographically targeted policies based on the 
provision of a variety of business incentives. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the choice 
of the outcome variable for the evaluation. Section 3 illustrates the policy relevant impact 
evaluation parameters. Section 4 illustrates impact identification strategies in non-
experimental settings. Section 5 discusses the issue of evaluations of single programs versus 
evaluations of multiple programs. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
1. Choosing the Outcome Variable of the Analysis 
In general terms, business incentive programs can produce desirable socio-economic 
outcomes through the following chain of causal links (Figure 1): 
 
Figure 1: Causal links from business incentives to desirable socio-economic outcomes 
A    B    C 
Eligible firms are informed 
on the existence of the 
program and find the 
program incentives worth to 
apply for them: program 
funds entirely allocated 
to assisted firms  
 
 
Program incentives are 
capable of modifying in a 
desirable way the investment 
and/or hiring behavior of the 
assisted firms 
  Program-induced increases in 
investments and economic 
activity by assisted firms 
generates some socio-economic 
improvements for the areas in 
which the incentives are 
available 
 
In order for a program to succeed, eligible firms need to be well informed on the existence of 
the program and need to find the program incentives worthy to apply for them. Measuring 
whether or not a program is capable of producing outcomes A, however, does not provide any 
kind of impact evaluation of the policy. This is because, even if the program is managed so 
that all program funds are allocated to applicant firms, the actual impact of the program could   4
still be zero in the event that all assisted firms would have made the same investment, or hired 
the same number of workers, even in the absence of the incentives.  
  Focusing the analysis on outcomes A, therefore, is only aimed at assessing whether or 
not the management of the program was effective in designing desirable incentive packages, 
marketing the program among eligible firms and properly handling the program application 
process.  Even if the program activity data are produced in the form of business outcomes, 
such as the number of jobs or the volume of investments generated by assisted firms, this type 
of analysis is not to be mistaken as an actual impact evaluation of the program, as it is still 
done in quite some number of reports commissioned by regional or state economic 
development agencies (both in the EU and in the US, as reported in Bartik 2004 and 
Bondonio and Greenbaum 2006) which erroneously assume that none of the business activity 
recorded in the assisted firms would have occurred in the absence of the program.  
  Proper impact evaluation analyses involve assessing whether or not the program 
incentives produce outcomes of type B or C.  Assessing whether or not business incentive 
programs achieve outcomes of type B, very often, requires acquiring, for both assisted and 
non-assisted firms, longitudinal data recording firm-level employment, capital expenditures, 
or sales.  Differentiation of the firm-level outcome data  between pre- and post-treatment 
times, needed to eliminate the selection bias due to correlation between unobserved fixed 
effects and the treatment, in the case of many business incentive policies, is very often to be 
performed as absolute changes rather percentage changes. This is because, for many business 
incentive policies the social benefit of each additional job/unit-of-investment/sales generated 
by the program incentives (compared to what would have happened in the absence of the 
program) is to be weighted equally whether or not the job/unit-of-investments/sales is 
generated in a small or large firm. 
Counterfactual statistical impact evaluation analyses focusing on the distant outcomes 
of type C should be performed mainly for programs targeting only specific geographic areas, 
such as, for example, the US state and federal Enterprise Zones (e.g. Krupka and Noonan 
2009, Bondonio and Greenbaum 2007, O’Keefe 2004, Greenbaum and Engberg 2004, Peters 
and Fisher 2002, Bondonio and Engberg 2000, Engberg and Greenbaum 1999, Boarnet and 
Bogart 1996, Papke 1994), the “Zones Franches Urbaine” of France (Rathelot and Sillard 
2008), the proposed “Zone Franche Urbane” of Italy, and, by some degree, the incentives co-
funded by the EU structural funds in “Objective 2 areas” (Bondonio and Greenbaum 2006). In 
such cases the economic weight of the program incentives is not disproportionably  small 
compared to the size of the economy of the local target areas, and appropriate comparison   5
group statistical models are capable of identifying the program impact on the target areas 
outcomes, controlling for the major confounding factors. Impact evaluations focused on 
outcomes of type C call for using geographically aggregated data on firm-outputs (such as 
employment, capital investments, sales), residents employment rate, per-capita income or 
indicators of improvements on the overall desirability of the target areas (such as housing 
values). In general terms, differentiation of the outcome variable yi.t (being i the geographic 
unit of the analysis) should take the form of percentage (log) changes rather than absolute 
changes. This is because for outcomes of type C, the intensity of the social benefits of the 
program-induced absolute change in y depends on the pre-intervention size of the target areas 
communities.  
In some cases, policy makers do also show interest in knowing program impacts on 
outcomes of type C even for incentives programs lacking specific geographic targeting. In 
principle, business incentives programs of all sorts are somehow capable of affecting distant 
outcomes, such as macro-economic or long-run indicators of the well-being of residents 
measured at the level of the entire provinces, regions, or states in which eligible firms are 
located.  In the vast majority of cases, however, the economic importance of the group of 
assisted firms, compared to the size of the province/region/state economy in which they are 
located is very little. As a result, any actual program impact (in the form of a positive impulse 
given to the province/region/state economy) becomes virtually undetectable from the changes 
to the outcome variable of the evaluation caused by many confounding factors (including, in 
many cases, the presence of other business incentive programs) of a much greater importance 
than the possible program-induced improvements in the economic activity of the assisted 
firms. 
Using rigorous comparison-group statistical impact evaluation designs to assess 
whether or not business incentives had long-lasting impacts on employment or economic 
activity outcomes of assisted firms is also often to be avoided. Assisted firms are economic 
units embedded in many ways in a network of economic transactions from ones to the others. 
In the medium/long-run, a possible positive program impulse produced on the assisted firms 
employment or economic activity is likely to have enough time to generate subsequent 
impacts also on non-assisted firms, those outcome data become endogenous to the treatment 
and cannot anymore be considered unaffected by the program incentives and used to retrieve 
counterfactual estimates. 
As a result, estimating the impact of business incentive policies in terms of long-run 
macro-economic or employment benefits for an overall province/regional/state economy,   6
should be attempted only using regional macroeconomic simulation models (such as REMI - 
Regional Economic Models inc., Fan, Treyz e Treyz 2000), as also suggested in Bartik 
(2004). Analyses with regional macroeconomic simulation models, however, should be 
performed only when the importance of the economic outputs of the assisted firms is not 
disproportionably smaller than the size of the local economy and only after having rigorously 
estimated the program impact on outcomes of type B. Lacking reliable evidence on the 
program impacts on the proximate outcomes recorded at the level of the assisted firms, the 
evaluation outcomes produced by regional macroeconomic simulation models would be 
upward biased. This is because the set of multipliers used by such models would be applied 
directly to measures of program activity (such as the entire volume of jobs or investments 
generated by the assisted firms), instead to only the number of additional jobs or new 
investments that the assisted firms would have not generated being absent the program 
incentives. 
 
2.  Policy Relevant Impact Evaluation Parameters  
Let’s define for each unit of observation a set of potential outcomes, one denoted by 
(0) y , 
indicating the outcome that would be observed if unit i received no treatment of any kind, and 
the other ones denoted by {
(1)
 
yx }x∈X, indicating the outcome of receiving a categorical 
treatment of type x, with {x = 1,2,….,X} being the different discrete treatment categories. Tx 
∈{0,1} is a binary indicator for the treatment of category x received (with Tx=0 corresponding 
to no treatment, and Tx=1 corresponding to treatment). In case of a single treatment category, 
notations simplifies to 
(0) y , 
(1) y , T∈{0,1}. 
 
3.1 Categorical Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATTs) 
The policy-relevant parameters, which are often of most interest for evaluating business 
incentives programs, are ATTs (Average Treatment Effects on the Treated), estimated either 
for a single category of treatment on the entire population of treated units, or for a number of 
different categories of treatment on different subpopulations of treated units. 
In cases when both the characteristics of the incentives and the pre-intervention 
observable covariates of the treated units are all fairly homogeneous, to obtain policy relevant 
empirical evidence is sufficient to estimate: 
τ = E[
(1) y - 
(0) y | T=1],     (1)   7
which represents the classic ATT parameter, for a single homogenous binary treatment.   
When, instead, the policy treatment has quite different economic values across the 
population of treated units, or when the treatment impact is expected to be different according 
to different pre-intervention observable characteristics (W) of the treated units, policy relevant 
empirical evidence is obtainable by estimating different ATTs for different subpopulations of 
the treated units and/or for different treatment categories: 




(0) y | Tx=1, W=w].  (2) 
In such cases, policy relevant empirical evidence is typically obtainable when the different 
treatment categories x are in the form of different ranges of economic values of the incentives, 
and/or in the form of different types of benefits granted to assisted firms. 
Estimating different impacts for different ranges of the economic value of the 
incentives is often of interest to policy makers because one of the most useful pieces of 
empirical evidence (in order to redefine future policy interventions) is the cost of the program 
per each additional unit of desirable outcome induced by the program.  Discrete categories of 
the economic treatment intensities are often more suitable than continuous specifications. This 
is because, in many cases, the information leading to the operationalization of the incentive 
data are based on parameters such the Net Equivalent Subsidy (NES), which provides the net 
present value of the capital grant equivalent subsidy and represents the EU standard for 
measuring the public support offered by member-States national and regional governments, 
or, for tax reduction subsidies, on parameters such as the economic value of the incentives 
based on the difference between the internal rates of return of an investment made by a typical 
firm with and without the provision of the program incentives (with estimates of the monetary 
value of the incentives that are retrieved using an hypothetical firm approach, such as the Tax 
and Incentive Model –TAIM- developed by Peters and Fischer 2002). Computing NES or 
TAIM figures is very data demanding, often resulting in estimations of the economic values 
of the incentives that, because of the presence of potential significant noise, do signal actual 
differences in treatment intensity only across fairly wide apart values. 
Categories of treatments based on different types of subsidies are policy relevant 
because, for example, in the EU and a number of US States, an  increasingly strong debate is 
centered on the issue of how to allocate program funds between capital grants, below-market-  8
rates and tax reduction subsidies, making of great interest to estimate categorical ATTs based 
on such policy distinctions
1.  
 
3.2 Distributions of the Program Treatment Effects 
A recent stream of the statistical literature on impact evaluation of social programs has 
focused on estimating the distribution of treatment effects represented, for example, by the 
proportion of treated units (considering either the entire population  of the treated or each 
policy- relevant category of treated units) for whom the outcome with the treatment  is greater 
or equal to the counterfactual outcome [i.e. y
(1)- y




(0) y ≥0]. Abadie et al. (2002), 
Cheser (2003), Carneiro, Hansen, Heckman (2003), Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005, 2006) 
and Firpo (2007)
2, among others, propose various identification strategies to estimate the 
distribution of treatment effects (often expressed as quantile treatment effects) and discuss the 
policy relevance of estimating impact results beyond mean effects on the treated  in social and 
education programs.  
In the case of business incentive policies, however, estimating the distribution of 
treatment effects (beyond identifying categorical ATTs)  could be often of limited interest. 
This is because, for many business incentive programs (at least when estimating treatment 
impacts on economic or employment outcomes of assisted firms -outcomes of type B in 
Figure 1), socially desirable outcomes do not arise directly from the well-being of the treated 
entities receiving the program benefits (i.e. the assisted entrepreneurs or the stockholders of 
the assisted firms).  Rather, socially desirable outcomes (in the form of economic or 
employment outcomes) are achieved indirectly when, for example, new jobs and/or 
investments attributable to the program incentives are generated in a declining local 
economy
3, or when they provide occupation to pockets of  unemployment. 
In such cases, similar socially desirable outcomes are often obtained whether or not 
the creation of new jobs or new investments is more concentrated among some of those 
assisted firms. Therefore, once policy-relevant categorical ATT parameters of the program 
                                                           
1 Below-market-interest-rate loans, for example, are typically more economical than capital grants (with the 
same amount  of public funds they allow the government to provide incentives to a much larger number of 
assisted firms than capital grants), while capital grants offer to assisted firms a financial advantage which is often 
superior to that of below-market interest rate loans (at least in times of not severe credit-crunch), embedding 
more potential to effectively modify the investment and hiring decisions of assisted firms. Tax reductions may 
not be very appealing to new firms and/or to research intensive ventures that do not expect to be profitable for 
their first periods of operations. 
2 See also Battistin and Fort (2008) for a concise review of such literature. 
3 This is not necessarily the case when the analysis focuses instead on estimating the impact of R&D incentives 
on measures of firms’ innovation outcomes.   9
intervention are estimated (based on either different policy features or characteristics of the 
treated units), limited policy relevance is left for the distribution of treatment effects within 
each specific category of treatment  may be of limited policy relevance. 
 
4. Impact Identification Strategies and Applicable Statistical Methods  
Table 1 summarizes the main identification strategies and statistical methods applicable in 
non-experimental comparison-group settings for estimating average treatment effects on the 
treated (ATTs) parameters in the context of the types of business incentive policies most 
commonly implemented in both the US and a number of EU countries. Compared to the 
impact identification strategies previously dicussed by Bartik (2004), Boarnet (2001), 
Bondonio (2000) and Bartik and Bigham (1997), the list of methods included in Table 1 adds 
a number of suitable approaches offered by the recent developments in the program 
evaluation statistical literature devoted to the estimation of ATTs parameters (namely: 
propensity score matching with program heterogeneity and generalized propensity score for 
continuous treatment; specification tests for non-experimental estimators based on partially 
fuzzy regression discontinuity design; conditional difference in difference with propensity 
score matching and propensity score estimations as first stage processing for reducing model 
dependence in parametric estimators). Regression discontinuity designs are also added among 
the methodological options of Table 1 as some relevant business incentive programs 
(especially in the EU) are based on rankings of applicant firms based on observable scores 
assigned to the proposed investment projects, with budget-induced cut-off points for program 
admissions. 
Some well established statistical approaches used for causal inference estimations in 
empirical economic studies, such as instrumental variable estimators, shift share analyses and 
basic difference in difference models are instead excluded from the viable methodological 
options  reported in Table 1.  Instrumental variable estimators, together with “Inverse Mills 
Ratio” and “Heckman Selection” estimators (e.g. Heckman and Robb 1985, Robinson 1989, 
Angrist and Krueger 2001) require the availability of a subset of variables that affect the 
treatment assignment but do not have a direct effect on outcome of the evaluation. Such 
variables are extremely difficult to be found for most of the commonly implemented business 
incentive policies, since treated units (whether firms or geographic areas) are selected based 
on the same pre-existing characteristics that are among the major factors affecting the 
outcome of interest for the evaluation. The only exceptions are represented by the 
geographically-targeted programs in which the selection into the program can be explained by   10
political variables measurable at a same geographic level of that of the target areas (e.g. 
Knight 2002, Wallace 2004). 
Shift share analyses (SSA)s were used, up to the mid nineties, to analyze 
geographically targeted incentive policies such as the Enterprise Zone programs of some US 
states (e.g. Dowall 1996 and Rubin and Wilder 1989). In order to identify the treatment 
effects of business incentive policies, however, (as also noted in Boarnet 2001) SSA 
approaches assume that the counterfactual outcomes that would have been recorded in the 
treated areas in the absence of the program incentives is affected only by a linear economic 
growth (adjusted for industry mix) of exactly the same proportion as the one recorded in the 
larger geographic units surrounding the program target areas. In many instances such 
assumption is very hard t justify and, in light of the many recent methodological 
advancements offered by the statistical literature, impact evaluation studies of geographically 
targeted business incentive policies, in the last fifteen years, have progressively turned away 
from adopting SSA approaches.  
Basic difference in difference (DD) estimators based on the mere availability of pre-
post-intervention longitudinal outcome data (with no observable control variables) are capable 
of retrieving program impact estimates only under the assumption that every type of 
heterogeneity between treated- and non-treated-units do have a constant influence on the level 
of the outcome variable in any of the times considered in the analysis (DD estimators), or (for 
the case of DDD estimators) on the linear trends of the outcome variable (e.g. Moffit 1991). 
For most of the business incentive programs such strict functional form assumptions on the 
influence of unobserved heterogeneity on the outcome variable of the analysis may be hard to 
justify. This is because, in many cases, pre-intervention characteristics of firms or geographic 
areas (which may differ between treated and non-treated units) may generate multipliers 
effects with no constant influence on levels or on the linear trends of the outcome variable. As 
a result, for evaluating business incentive policies in the common cases when at least some 
data on observable pre-intervention characteristics are available, basic DD or DDD designs 
are often surpassed by the conditional difference in difference (CDD) approaches summarized 
in Table 1 that avoid relying on fixed-effects assumptions for all possible sources of 
heterogeneity between treated and non-treated units.  
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Table 1: Non-experimental impact identification strategies and statistical methods  for 
business incentives programs in non-experimental settings 
Identification strategy  Description 
 
Exploiting natural 















Conditional difference in 
difference with binary 
propensity score statistical 
matching (CDD-PSM) 
 
Propensity score matching 
(PSM) with program 
heterogeneity: PSM with 
discrete treatment 
categories; Generalizes PS 




 “Three stages conditional 
difference in difference 
estimators (3STG-CDD): 
PSM as a first-stage 
processing for reducing 




NEC can be exploited when it’s possible to compare outcomes 
from units located within a same  cohesive local community 
crossed by some administrative boundaries which generates two 
different areas A, B. In area A the program incentives become 
available Pr{T=1|A}>0. No incentives are available in area B 
Pr{T=1|B}=0 
 
Sharp RDD can be applied when applicant firms are ranked based 
on observable characteristics K and program incentives are 
awarded only to firms with K>k . In such cases, for firms in a 
neighbourhood of k , the treatment status is nearly randomly 





− k }.  
 
 
Observable pre-intervention differences between assisted and non-
assisted units are controlled for by PSM. Fixed-effects unobserved 
characteristics are controlled for by a DD design on outcomes of 
matched units 
 
Imbens (2000), Lechner (2001, 2002) extensions of PSM to 
multiple treatment categories. Joffe and Rosembaum (1999) and 
Lu et al. (2001) matching estimator for programs with ordered 
doses of treatment. Hirano and Imbens (2004) or Imai and Van 
Dyk (2004), extension of PSM to continuous treatments. Without 
implementing a DD design on outcomes of matched units (or 
without properly differencing the outcome variable), impact 
identification relies on pure selection on observables assumptions 
 
I) based on each categorical binary variable Tx,w (x∈X  incentives 
types, w∈W firm characteristics), a set of PS vectors are 
estimated. 
II) for each treatment category, units outside the PS common 
support regions are eliminated 
III) a CDD parametric model (with categorical treatments and 
control variables with flexible functional forms) is estimated on 
units with common support 
 
 
What follows is a concise review of each identification strategies and statistical methods 
reported in Table 1, discussing the extent to which each methodological option is a good fit 
for the different types of policies to be evaluated, the different choices of the outcome 
variable of the evaluation, the different scenarios of data availability and whether or not the   12
analysis focuses on outcomes recorded at a firm-level or at the level of the geographic areas in 
which the assisted firms are located. 
 
4.1 Exploiting Natural Experiment Conditions  
Exploiting geographical natural experiment conditions (GNEC) has been used to evaluate 
state-wide incentives/tax programs in the US, focusing on data from communities crossed by 
state borders which determine differences in the treatment status of firms (e.g. Holmes 1998). 
In general terms, such identification strategy is best applicable to evaluate the impact of 
incentive programs at the regional/state/province level, with eligible firms selling their goods 
and/or services predominantly within the local markets in which they are located, and with 
focus on outcomes of type B (Figure 1). In such cases, threats to the validity of the analysis 
come, by the most part, from changes (exogenous to the program incentives) that may occur 
in the economy of the local communities in which assisted and non-assisted firms are located. 
In order to control for such confounding factors all other identification strategies have to rely 
either on conditional independence assumption (CIA, i.e. selection into treatment is based on 
observables characteristics of firms’ local markets/communities) or on the hypothesis that all 
(or part of) the unobserved heterogeneity of firms’ local markets/communities are fixed 
effects (in case of DD schemes applied to comparisons of firms outcomes), or at least fixed 
linear growth trends (in case of DDD schemes). Exploiting GNEC enables to identify program 
impacts without having to rely on such assumptions, at the risk, however, of producing results 
with weaker external validity, if GNEC can be found only for a small percentages of assisted 
firms, and neither the program incentives nor the assisted firms have fairly homogenous 
characteristics. 
 
4.2 Regression Discontinuity Designs (RDD)s and specification tests based on partially 
fuzzy RDDs 
Sharp regression discontinuity designs (RDD) can be typically applied when the focus of the 
analysis is on evaluating proximate firm-level outcomes (i.e. outcomes of type B, Figure 1) 
and the programs being investigated offer the availability of data on rankings of applicants (an 
example of such programs is Italy’s law 488/92 which has been evaluated with a sharp RDD 
approach by Bronzini De Blasio 2006 and Pellegrini Carlucci 2003). With sharp RDDs 
treatment  impacts are estimated by comparing the outcomes from the applicant firms ranked 
just above and below the cut-off point k  that determines the treatment status (e.g. Rubin 1977   13
and Trockim 1984). This is because in such neighborhood of k   the treatment status can be 
though of being nearly randomly assigned (with firms in the treatment and comparison group 
having similar characteristics). As sharp RDD can identify mean impact estimates only for the 
assisted firms in the neighborhood of k , results are typically of acceptable external validity 
(from a policy-relevance point of view) only if both incentive payments and the 
characteristics of the assisted firms are fairly homogeneous throughout the entire population 
of treated. As proposed in Battistin and Rettore (2008), “partially fuzzy” RDD set-ups (which 
requires data availability on non-eligible units, eligible units that choose not to participate in 
the program, and program participants) could yield a specification test (in the neighborhood 
of  k ) to assess the local properties of any non-experimental estimators usable to retrieve the 
treatment impacts on the whole population of treated. For business incentives policies, 
however, “partially fuzzy” RDD conditions may be quite a rare occurrence. This is because 
for programs with incentive payments based on a competitive auction process, data on the 
final rankings of applicant firms do typically exclude firms that drop-off from the auction. As 
a results virtually all observable firms above the cut-off threshold k  do receive the program 
incentives, while all firms below k  do not. Programs with no competitive auctions do not 
maintain lists of eligible firms. As a result, either available firm-level data are not sufficient to 
disentangle eligible non-treated firms from non-eligible firms, or the program eligibility rule 
(based for example on a simple binary coding of firms’ sector classification) is such that a 
neighborhood of the eligibility threshold is hard to find, and eligible and non-eligible firms 
are likely to be exposed to quite different economic exogenous dynamics in times during the 
program implementation. 
 
4.3 Conditional Difference in Difference with Propensity Score Matching  
Conditional difference in difference designs, with propensity score matching (CDD-PSM, e.g. 
Heckman et al. 1998), are best applicable to programs for which a multitude of comparison 
units and some data on observable pre-intervention variables (which may be distributed 
differently between treated and non-treated units) are available for the analysis. With the 
CDD-PSM approach, the observable characteristics which my be different between units in 
the treatment and comparison group are controlled for by a PSM design, which (through it’s 
well known balancing property, Rosembaum and Rubin 1983, ) surpasses the difficulties of 
choosing the proper functional forms of the control variables.  Unobserved heterogeneity 
between treated and non-treated units is then controlled for by relying on DD (or DDD)   14
schemes applied on the outcomes of the matched units. Such procedure, ensure that ATT 
parameters are identified relying on fixed-effects assumptions (or fixed linear growth rate 
assumptions in the case of DDD) only for unobserved heterogeneity, while observed 
heterogeneity is controlled for without such assumptions. 
 
4.4 Propensity Score Matching with Program Heterogeneity 
Imbens (2000), Lechner (2001, 2002) and Imai and Van Dyk (2004) extensions of PSM 
estimators to cases of multiple treatment categories are valuable alternatives to evaluate 
programs with treatment heterogeneity (related either to different ranges of economic values 
of the incentives, and/or to different types of benefits granted to assisted firms) and/or 
programs with heterogeneity of the treated units. In the case of programs with ordered doses 
of treatment, the matching estimator of Joffe and Rosembaum (1999) and Lu et. al. (2001), 
which entails a single scalar propensity score for all dose levels, is another possible option.  
Some type of Generalized propensity score estimator (GPS), finally, could also be applied for 
evaluating programs with continuous levels of the economic value of the incentives (Hirano 
and Imbens 2004 and Imai and Van Dyk 2004)
4. In their pure forms, however, extended PSM, 
GPS and matching-with-ordered-treatment-doses estimators strictly rely on selection on 
observables identification assumptions (either for both the selection into the program and the 
selection into the different treatment categories/doses/levels, or exclusively for the latter -as in 
one estimator proposed in Behrman et. al. 2004). In order to control for fixed-effects- or 
fixed-linear-growth-rate- unobserved heterogeneity between treated and non-treated units (or 
among different treatment categories/doses/levels), therefore, it’s advisable, also in these 
cases, to complement such estimators with a DD (or DDD) scheme applied on the outcomes 
of the matched units (or to transform the outcome variable into differences, in the case of the 
GPS estimator). 
 
4.5 Three Stages Conditional Difference in Difference  
For evaluating multiple programs with many sources of treatment heterogeneity, variation in 
the economic level of the incentives and heterogeneity of treated units, a further possible 
option is to implement PS as a “nonparametric” first-stage processing for reducing model 
dependence in parametric estimators of treatment impact estimates (Ho et.al. 2007). A 
suitable procedure of this sort could be the following three stages conditional difference in 
                                                           
4 To evaluate the impact of a business capital subsidy policy with continuous treatment  (the Italian Law 488/92), 
a two steps matching estimators has also been proposed (Adorno et al. 2007).   15
difference estimator (3STG-CDD): I) based on each categorical binary variable Tx,w (x∈X  
incentives types, w∈W firm characteristics), a set of PS vectors are estimated; II) for each 
treatment category, units outside the PS common support regions are eliminated; III) a CDD 
parametric model (with categorical treatments and control variables with flexible functional 
forms) is estimated on units with common support. Since such 3STG-CDD procedure cannot 
exploit the PSM balancing property, extensive sensitivity analysis is to be performed to test 
how impact results may differ based on different functional forms of controls. 
 
5. Single-program-  versus multiple-programs-  evaluations 
For business incentive policies, unlike the case of other public policies, multiple different 
programs are frequently available to the same eligible units (i.e. same types of eligible firms 
in a same geographic area). In many EU countries, in a same geographic area and for a same 
type of eligible firms, different EU-sponsored, National and Regional programs may coexist
5, 
and in some areas of the US, federal, state and local programs frequently overlap (Hultquist 
2007). As a result, the different methodological options discussed in the paper are applicable 
to either single-program evaluations or comparative joint evaluations of multiple programs.  
Single-program evaluation studies (SPEs) are by far more frequent in the literature than 
evaluations of multiple programs (MPEs). SPEs require much less data collection efforts, and 
often, they can rely on simpler operationalizational rules for coding the treatment variables. In 
order to identify policy-relevant average treatment effects on the treated (or on subpopulations 
of the treated units), however, SPEs have to rely on the crucial assumption that treated- and 
non-treated- firms have the same conditional probability of receiving assistance also from the 
different unobserved incentive programs for which they are eligible during the time span 
considered in the analysis: 
P(Tx*=1 | W, Tx=1) = P(Tx*=1 | W, Tx =0),  for all x
*∈X
* and x∈X   (3) 
where {x = 1,2,….,X} represents the set of treatments being the focus of the impact evaluation 
analysis, and {x
* = 1,2,….,X*} represents the set of treatments from the different unobserved 
incentive programs that may be available to treated and non-treated firms
6. 
                                                           
5 In the Piemonte region of Italy, for example, in the last five years, the average number of such overlapping 
programs was in excess of twenty (Bondonio 2007). 
6 If P(Tx*=1 | Tx=1) ≠ P(Tx*=1 | Tx =0), identifying policy relevant average treatment effects on the treated with 
SPEs would require to assume that none of the incentive programs, other than the ones being evaluated, may 
affect the firm outcome considered in the analysis:  {
(1)
 
* yx = 
(0)
 
* yx } x*∈X*.   16
Quite often such assumption is not much plausible
7 and findings from SPEs can suffer 
from attenuation bias (in the most frequent cases in which non-assisted firms are more likely 
to gain access to other forms of incentives than assisted firms). MPEs, instead, although 
requiring extensive data collection efforts, do not have to rely on such crucial assumption (as 
all of the sources of incentive payments are typically observed), and they are often capable of 
exploiting the across-programs heterogeneity of incentives and designation rules to provide 
findings with large external validity. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper reviews and discusses the different options in choosing the appropriate outcome 
data, parameters of interest, impact identification strategies and statistical methods that are 
best suited to estimate, in non-experimental settings, how much of the different outcomes 
between treatment and comparison groups are attributable to business incentive policies. 
  Choosing the appropriate outcome variable/s for the analysis stems from clearly 
highlighting the chain of causal links from business incentives to desirable socio-economic 
outcomes, and from acknowledging the difference between enumerating program activities 
and estimating program effects.  The choice between focusing on proximate firm-level 
outcomes rather than on community-level socio-economic outcomes is to be based on the 
types of programs analyzed and on the relative economic importance of their incentives 
compared to size of the local communities in which the assisted investment projects are 
located. Long-run macro-economic effects for an overall province/regional/state economy in 
which the program incentives are allocated should not be estimated with comparison-group 
statistical methods but rather with regional macroeconomic simulation models. Such 
province/regional/state-wide macroeconomic effects, however, should be estimated only 
when the importance of the economic outputs of the assisted firms is not disproportionably 
smaller than the size of the local economy and only after having rigorously estimated the 
program impact on proximate firm-level outcomes, using reliable comparison-group statistical 
methods. 
  When estimating the effects of business incentive policies with comparison-group 
statistical methods, the impact evaluation parameters of most interest are categorical average 
treatment effects on the treated based on either different ranges of economic values of the 
incentives or different types of benefits granted to the assisted firms. The recent developments 
in the program evaluation statistical literature offers a number of viable methods to estimate 
                                                           
7 With some few exceptions such as Italy’s Law 488/92.   17
such parameters. Choosing which methods are best suited for the analysis is to be based 
primarily on whether or not: the focus of the analysis is on proximate firm-level outcomes, 
rather than on community-level socio-economic outcomes; the program/s to be evaluated have 
many sources of treatment heterogeneity; the process to select assisted firms is based on 
rankings of applicants based on observable scores assigned to the proposed investment 
projects.  
When evaluating business incentive policies is finally important to take into account 
that multiple different programs are often available to the same eligible firms in a same 
geographic area. As a result, in many instances, impact evaluations with statistical 
comparison-group designs can focus on investigating either the single effects of individual 
programs or the simultaneous effects of a set of different overlapping programs. Single-
program evaluations are by far more frequent in the literature than simultaneous evaluations 
of multiple programs. It’s important to notice, however, that single-program evaluations, in 
the presence of multiple overlapping incentive policies, can yield reliable empirical evidence 
only under the challenging assumption that treated- and non-treated- firms have the same 
conditional probability of receiving assistance also from the unobserved programs that operate 
in the same domain of the analysis. 
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